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Abstract 
The United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, shortly after the 9/11 terroristic 
attack by Al-Qaeda. Although the U.S. invaded to pursue the leader of Al-Qaeda, 
Osama Bin-Laden, women’s rights and freedoms in Afghanistan under the Taliban 
were at the heart of the Bush administration’s agenda of the “war on terror.” Through 
analysis of existing literature and data, this study seeks to discover how U.S. gender 
policy for post-Taliban Afghanistan was shaped, and asks, what are its pros and cons? 
The study indicates that political discourses on women’s rights and freedoms shaped 
U.S. gender policy for post-Taliban Afghanistan; however, women still suffer from 
inequality and conflict.
Introduction
President George W. Bush announced the plan to invade Afghanistan shortly after 
the 9/11 terroristic attack in the United States. President Bush wanted to chase 
Osama Bin-Laden and bring him to justice for attacking the United States. At that 
time, the Taliban, a brutal fundamentalist Islamic regime, was ruling Afghanistan 
and had close ties with Osama Bin-Laden, the leader of the Al-Qaeda network. 
The Taliban was giving Bin-Laden safe haven in Afghanistan to hide and live; thus, 
there was a good reason for President Bush to invade Afghanistan. The Taliban was 
not only providing safe haven for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks, but it also 
brutally oppressed non-Pashtun citizens, including women. 
Through the study of the existing literature and data about the issue, this paper 
seeks to discover how the U.S. gender policy for post-Taliban Afghanistan was 
shaped. Furthermore, this paper includes a study of the recent events which are 
significantly affecting the lives of Afghan women nineteen years after the defeat of 
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the Taliban by the George W. Bush administration. This paper argues that political 
discourses on Afghan women’s rights and freedoms shaped U.S. gender policy 
for post-Taliban Afghanistan; however, the achievements of Afghan women from 
implementation of this policy is entirely fragile. Therefore, nineteen years later, 
once again, the future and destiny of Afghan women are on the U.S.-Taliban peace 
negotiation table in Doha, Qatar. 
Political Discourses that Shaped U.S. Gender Policy for Post-Taliban Afghanistan
In 2001, U.S. gender policy for Afghanistan was politically shaped in order to justify 
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and to attain support from Americans and funding 
from Congress for war. To justify invasion and war, Afghan women were framed in 
every possible way as silent prisoners so that Western powers saw it as their moral 
and political obligation to run and free them. In “Women’s Rights and ‘Righteous 
War’: An Argument for Women’s Autonomy in Afghanistan,” Gillian Wylie claims 
that former U.S. president George W. Bush pushed the discourses of Afghan women’s 
rights and freedom to benefit his agenda of invasion of Afghanistan: “In defending 
US policy, President George Bush never failed to mention the liberation of women 
as one of his moral ends. Greeting the fall of Kabul in January, he announced that 
the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were now free” (217). But as Wylie’s study 
shows, the rhetoric of Afghan women’s freedom in the aftermath of U.S. invasion 
proved to be a delusion (217). Wylie argues that political discourses of women’s 
rights and freedoms in 2001 was part of the Bush administration’s justification of 
war. Wylie describes Bush’s approach toward the issue thusly: “Establishing women’s 
rights became part of the moral justification given for waging ‘war on terror’ by 
overthrowing the Taliban and ensuring regime change in Afghanistan” (217). 
It is worth noticing that under Taliban regime, it was not only women who 
suffered. Men also were forced to engage in certain practices, including mandatory 
prayers, keeping beards, and wearing turbans. Focusing just on women’s rights and 
freedom and their physical appearance has raised many questions in Afghan society 
as well as in the circle of scholars who follow this issue. Many scholars argue that by 
focusing on the oppression of women by the Taliban regime, the Bush administration 
sought to generate empathy and gain support for war. Deniz Kandiyoti argues in 
“Old Dilemmas or New Challenges? The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in 
Afghanistan,” for example, that “the plight of women in Afghanistan was invoked, 
—   3   —
How U.S. Gender Policy for Post-Taliban Afghanistan Was Shaped
among other things, as a humanitarian crisis justifying military intervention” (169). 
Kandiyoti also argues that reversing abuses of women’s rights became an explicit item 
of policy, at least at the level of rhetoric (169). 
The misrepresentation of Afghan women as a political instrument to justify 
war in Afghanistan not only was a commodity in the political circles of the Bush 
administration. The U.S. media too had a great role in the representation of Afghan 
women as oppressed objects who were begging silently for help. Armed Taliban 
fighters beating poor women screaming in pain under blue burqas were the favorite 
images of Western media, specifically U.S. media, in 2001 and after. Thus, U.S. 
mainstream media alongside U.S. policy makers used these miseries of Afghan 
women to catch attention and support from American citizens and funding from 
Congress for war in Afghanistan. Presentation of Afghan women in blue burqas 
covering them head to toe as a sign of oppression was an image that the U.S. 
media frequently displayed. In 2001 and afterward, one could see such images in 
television, in newspapers, on the front pages of popular magazines. In the words of 
Kevin Ayotte and Mary Husain, “the image of the Afghan woman shrouded in the 
burqa has played a leading role in various public arguments seeking to justify U.S. 
military intervention” (113). Most Afghan women practiced burqa under Taliban 
regime coercion but Afghan women had to wear burqa during Mujahedeen rule 
too, a regime the U.S. directly supported in their fight against the Soviet Union 
military invasion of Afghanistan. But discourses regarding the urgency of freeing 
them under the leadership of U.S. military force only emerged significantly when the 
U.S. wanted to invade Afghanistan. Those political discourses worked, and the Bush 
administration acquired both funding for war and the support of U.S. taxpayers. 
In her study, “The Symbolic Use of Afghan Women in the War on Terror,” Kim 
Berry states that, “The Bush administration’s focus on the oppression of Afghan 
women emerged in the midst of the construction and implementation of the ‘war 
on terror,’ and given that public support for this on-going war is being mobilized 
through a strategic use of words and images” (138). Furthermore, among political 
discourses on women’s rights in Afghanistan, Laura Bush’s radio speech is the one 
which has caught the attention of many scholars who have discussed the issue. Laura 
Bush, the First Lady of the United States in 2001, delivered on November 17 an 
emotional radio speech about the situation of Afghan women and children under 
Taliban rule. Lila Abu-Lughod argues that such cultural framing of women has 
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prevented the serious exploration of the roots and nature of human suffering in this 
part of the world, and has cited part of Mrs. Bush’s speech as follows:
…the very separate causes in Afghanistan of women’s 
continuing malnutrition, poverty, and ill health, and their 
more recent exclusion under the Taliban from employment, 
schooling, and the joys of wearing nail polish. On the other 
hand, her speech reinforced chasmic divides, primarily 
between the ‘civilized people throughout the world’ whose 
hearts break for the women and children of Afghanistan and 
the Taliban-and-the-terrorists, the cultural monsters who want 
to, as she put it, ‘impose their world on the rest of us’ (784).
Abu-Lughod further argues that such political discourse has hindered experts from 
deeply exploring the political and historical roots of the problem and its violence. 
Instead of asking questions acknowledging global interconnections, “experts were 
being asked to give religio-cultural [responses].… we were offered [questions] that 
worked to artificially divide the world into … West versus East, us versus Muslims, 
cultures in which First Ladies give speeches versus others where women shuffle 
around silently in burqas” (784). 
In a study titled “Appropriating Women’s Agendas,” Sally Kitch and Margaret 
Mills argue that “Laura Bush appropriated women’s issues for U.S. strategic and 
political purposes and was, in turn, appropriated by her husband for those same 
purposes” (66). However, Kitch and Mills also argue that subsequent events show 
that promoting women’s rights and freedom was not the primary goal of Bush 
administration (66). And, despite significant criticism, U.S. gender policy for post-
Taliban Afghanistan had received great praise in Afghanistan in the early years as it 
opened some windows of opportunity for a significant number of women in different 
parts of the country, even though fragile and short term. 
Impacts of U.S. Gender Policy on Living Conditions of Afghan Women
Although U.S. gender policy opened windows of hope for some Afghan women 
who were craving freedom and equality in the early years, later it was proved that the 
gender policy of the U.S. for Afghanistan was entirely fragile and currently seems 
close to failure. In the early years following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the 
utilization of gender policy there had been accompanied by flows of aid which had 
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opened door for a significant number of women, especially in the capital of Kabul 
and some big cities. Soon after the fall of the Taliban, the flow of development 
aid and projects provided women with job opportunities in different sectors. 
According to a study by Margaret Courtney Barnard conducted in 2014, “…since 
2002, USAID has provided more than $17 billion in aid to Afghanistan” (44). She 
explained that this aid targeted “three main programs… economic growth … the 
establishment of a democratic and capable state governed by the rule of law, and 
lastly the provision of basic services for its people” (44). Furthermore, she claimed 
that since 2001, promotion of women’s education, maternal health, and women’s 
empowerment were at the top of the U.S. development aid list in Afghanistan 
(44). According to Barnard’s findings, in the early years after the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan, the confidence of people toward international NGOs was high: “with 
regard to national and international NGOs, in 2011, 56% of Afghans placed ‘a lot’ of 
confidence in international NGOs, in 2012 the number dropped to 53%, and then 
to 51% in 2013” (36). Focus on the education of girls was another arena that caught 
the most attention in 2002 and afterward. 
According to a 2014 study by Nandini Deo, “since 2001, donors have given 
almost $2 billion towards rebuilding the overall education system [in Afghanistan], 
from physical reconstruction to human resources development” (17). According 
to this study, Afghans constantly insist on education of girls as a tool for a brighter 
future, and that “while some illiterate fathers may hesitate to support the education 
of their children, most Afghan parents see education as a key to greater opportunity 
and social mobility” (17). According to Deo, regardless of the positive opinion toward 
girls’ education in Afghanistan, the interventionist policy of the West currently has 
created a negative sensitivity among people in different regions of the country:
Today the pressure from international donors to adopt gender 
equality is often met with hostility. Gender mainstreaming, 
which is the government’s express policy for promoting 
gender equality, is not succeeding. ‘Members of the civil 
service widely perceive gender mainstreaming as policy 
imported from outside the country, and do not generally feel 
they have ownership of its implementation’ (Anna Larson, 
2008, quoted in Deo 15).
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Based on another study by Mariam Alamyar, from 2001 to 2004 the number of 
school enrollments in different regions of Afghanistan increased from one million 
students to seven million. According to this study, “overall, the number of girls 
enrollments increased from 839,000 to more than 2.5 million during the same 
period” (58). According to Alamyar, “in 2008, more than 79,000 students — 
twenty-six percent of them female — graduated from high school and approximately 
110,000 of 160,000 were teachers provided with teacher training” (58). According to 
the findings of this study, in 2014 about 2,700 students were enrolled in the National 
Institution of Management and Administration of Kabul University and from 2003 
to 2016, the U.S. embassy and USAID in Kabul sent more than 100 students to the 
United States to pursue masters and bachelor’s degrees each year (59).
In the case of job opportunities for women at the present time, based on the new 
constitution of Afghanistan, women are reserved twenty-five percent of parliament 
seats. Many women work in high positions in government institutions, private 
sectors, and international institutions that are actively operating in Afghanistan. 
Currently, the chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission is 
a woman. A significant number of women work in the media industry, women are 
involved in trade and business, and the list goes on. 
However, growing insecurity, the intensification of ongoing conflict, and the 
active presence of many terroristic networks such as the ISIS militias in the country 
(as well as the power and recognition from the Unites States the Taliban is getting 
as U.S.-Taliban negotiations are going on in Doha, Qatar), has caused extreme 
anxiety among the people of Afghanistan, specifically women. The opportunities and 
achievements that women in different parts of the country have gained as a result 
of the implementation of U.S. gender policy and the flow of aid in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan appears to be extremely fragile, unsustainable, and unmanageable. 
As many scholars argue, promoting gender equality from the outside in a male-
dominated country with a 99.9% Muslim population is proving not to be an 
idea welcomed by all citizens of that country. From the very first years, even as 
a small group of people enjoyed the flow of aid coming simultaneously with the 
implementation of U.S. gender policy, the majority of the people were suspicious 
of the U.S. promotion of gender equality and women’s rights. Later, people openly 
expressed opposition to gender equality discourses and, as a result, even women 
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perceived to be working for foreigners or Americans who were promoting gender 
equality and women’s rights were attacked by men, including in the capital, Kabul. 
In a study titled “‘We Are Farkhunda’: Geographies of Violence, Protest, and 
Performance,” Jennifer Fluri and Rachel Lehr describe the brutal mob killing of a 
young Lady Farkhonda in Capital Kabul in March 2015. According to the study, 
an imam accused Farkhunda of being an American agent and burning the Quran: 
“an act that is considered extremely defamatory to Islam” (151). Despite Farkhunda 
repeatedly denying the act of burning the Quran, many angry men soon surrounded 
her, started beating her and dragging her by the hair, kicking her, and finally, as 
police lost control of the situation, Farkhunda was burned after being killed by a man 
driving a car on her body (152). Farkhunda’s death provoked women’s rights activists 
and civil organizations all around the country to protest violence against women, but 
her case still has not received justice and most of those men involved in her killing 
walk freely in Kabul city. 
However, Farkhunda was not the only woman who was killed in a such brutal way 
less than two miles away from the presidential palace. On a daily basis, many women 
face violence and die both in government-controlled regions as well as in Taliban-
controlled zones. According to a study titled “Misogyny in post-war Afghanistan: The 
changing frames of sexual and gender-based violence” by Ahmad Lida and Priscyll 
Anctil Avoine, violence against women has increased significantly after the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the U.S. but in a different context. He argues that:
Fourteen years after … the situation is still unstable, complex 
and women have been forgotten once again with increasing 
forms of misogyny that are structurally legitimized by 
tradition, laws, the international community and the current 
political situation (97).
This study indicates that the changing frames of violence against women are 
extensively related to the political situation of the country as public and politicians’ 
attention is turned to the peace talks between Taliban and the Afghan government 
(97). Many scholars argue that improvement of Afghan women’s life conditions 
was not a priority for the Bush administration as it was expressed in women’s rights 
discourses. These scholars say the Bush administration only pushed their political 
agendas for invasion of the country in different ways, one of which was the rhetoric 
of women’s rights and freedom. In the presence of international forces under the 
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leadership of the U.S., with war and conflict between international forces, the Afghan 
military and terroristic networks continue, Afghan women still are the primary 
victims, and they are paying a high price in a different context. As most women are 
suffering, only a few elite families are enjoying the current situation, those in the top 
positions or those with close ties to the corrupt U.S.-installed Afghan government. 
As Maliha Chishti states, while the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan has paved the 
way for many women to take part in social, political, government and economic 
activities, the lives of the vast majority of women has not improved at all. As 
she further states, “bad donor-driven priorities and policies, in addition to aid 
mismanagement and ineffective implementation, have over the past seven years 
offered the vast majority of Afghan women very few improvements” (266). Chishti 
argues that change in the lives of those Afghan women who were benefitting from 
partnering with the U.S.-installed government of Afghanistan was encouraged 
by the Bush administration to celebrate the triumph of few people for the whole 
country: “President Bush insisted on the liberal success over the Taliban, encouraging 
Americans and Afghans to celebrate the signaling in of a new era of prosperity for the 
entire country.” Chishti further states: 
The Bush administration clearly set out to distinguish the old 
(Taliban-ruled) Afghanistan as a country plagued by a shortage 
of health facilities, disease, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, 
and the public and private oppression of women. In contrast, 
the newly liberated Afghan nation was ostensibly emerging as 
a strong, changed nation (266).
However, as mentioned in the previous section, those limited improvements in 
the lives of a small number of women, especially in big cities, was soon followed 
by increased violence. Facing insecurity, systematic violence from the Taliban, and 
increased threats, especially in provinces where the government was losing control as 
the Taliban started getting power, women in most cases chose to leave their jobs and 
stay home, and girls gradually started postponing school for an unclear future.
U.S. Forces’ Withdrawal from Afghanistan is Posing a Real Threat to Women and 
their Nineteen Years of Achievements
Although the real threat and concerns regarding the failure of the gender policy of the 
U.S. which now belongs to those women who celebrated victory and thus concerns 
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about the vulnerability of women and their achievements of the past nineteen years, 
since the invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S. were revealed in 2014, when plans for 
the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan were announced. Additionally, 
concerns are growing day by day since 2019, almost two decades after the defeat of 
the Taliban and the invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S., as U.S.–Taliban peace talks 
are going on, and once again, Afghan women’s future and destiny is on the U.S.-
Taliban peace negotiations table in Qatar. 
The U.S. announced its military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 while 
insecurity was in progress and the Taliban had started targeting civilians as they were 
regaining power in many parts of Afghanistan. In the words of David Cortright, 
this announcement of the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan posed a specific 
risk to women who had used the opportunities offered through U.S. intervention: 
“While improving the status of women is not the reason U.S. forces intervened in 
Afghanistan, it has become an important concern as our military begins to withdraw” 
(8). Cortright’s finding show that Afghan “women face renewed threats. The Taliban 
regained control in some communities and reactionary former warlords have 
increased their influence in Kabul’s government” (9). According to Cortright, the 
U.S. invasion and its policy regarding gender equality and women’s rights during the 
past thirteen years has proved harmful even to women who are engaged in politics 
and economics, women who work within the Afghan government, and those who 
work with international organizations (9). Cortright further argues, “Opposition to 
continued Western military involvement has produced a backlash against women’s 
rights, which is seen by some Afghans as an alien imposition. Women who exercise 
leadership skills are often called anti-Islamic, Western agents, or prostitutes” (9). 
Furthermore, studies indicate that women are concerned about their rights and 
freedom as U.S. representatives and the Taliban are trying to make a peace deal in 
Doha, Qatar. Since 2019, almost two decades after the defeat of the Taliban and the 
invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S., once again, Afghan women’s future and destiny 
are on the U.S.-Taliban peace negotiations table in Doha, Qatar. In 2019, President 
Donald Trump’s administration announced that the U.S. would start direct peace 
negotiation with the Taliban to end the twenty-year-long U.S. war in Afghanistan. 
According to a study by Ashok Behuria, Yaqoob Ul Hassan, and Sanya Saroha, the 
United States set the agenda of negotiations with the Taliban in September 2018 
“by appointing Zalmay Khalilzad as the special representative for Afghanistan 
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reconciliation” (127). Currently, the talks between U.S. representative Khalilzad, the 
Taliban, and the representatives of the government of Afghanistan are ongoing in 
Doha. According to Behuria et al., as the U.S. is directly engaged in the peace talks 
with the Taliban, there is an indication that the Taliban now feels more powerful:
The rapidly declining security situation inside Afghanistan, 
ever since the US–Taliban talks began, clearly indicates 
that the Taliban now, more than ever before, feel morally 
ascendant, while forces that backed the fledgling democratic 
experiment in Afghanistan are showing signs of fatigue and 
frustration (127).
According to Behuria et al., during the peace talks, the Taliban even outlined their 
non-negotiable list of issues, some of which are as follows: 
The U.S. would not be allowed to discuss internal affairs, the 
Taliban would not stop killing people supporting occupation 
forces; and they would only agree to uphold freedom of the 
press, civil societies, and political organizations … under the 
framework of Islamic values (128).
According to Behuria et al., “these are red lines that should legitimately worry the 
U.S. negotiators” (128). Considering the Taliban’s past attitude toward women, 
these red lines are of great concern for all women in Afghanistan particularly for 
those women who are engaged in political, social, economic, and other activities 
out of home, as well. Currently, a great number of active women are asking the 
Afghan government and the U.S. representative Khalilzad Afghan that women’s 
rights and achievements should not be compromised during peace talks with the 
Taliban in Qatar. 
In an article titled “Feminism, Peace, and Afghanistan,” Sima Samar argues that 
the Afghan women are excluded from ongoing peace talks: “peace and negotiation 
with opposing non-state actors have dominated the current dialogue. Afghan women 
continue to be excluded from the decision-making processes” (145). She argues that, 
historically, women have played a central role in the events and process of war and 
peace in Afghanistan, like the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan which in a huge part was 
justified in the name of freedom and the rights of women (146). She further warns 
about the exclusion of women in the current Qatar peace negotiation and says: 
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Yet, the current peace negotiation being brokered seems to 
have forgotten the dire human rights situation of Afghan 
women and has neglected the fact that their future role within 
the country will have a significant impact on attaining truly 
sustainable and long-lasting peace (146).
Throughout its history, Afghanistan has experienced the invasions of several great 
powers, from Great Britain to the Soviet Union to the U.S. During their stay in 
power in Afghanistan, every superpower has projected a different lifestyle for Afghan 
women. During the former Russian occupation of Afghanistan, the USSR-backed 
government led by Nur Mohmad Taraki for the first time politically utilized women 
rights: “it was within this time frame where they began utilizing women’s rights 
as a political tool” (Samar 147). After the defeat of the USSR-backed government 
of Najibullah and the victory of the mujahidin, with the help of the former U.S. 
government, women again were forced to stay home and away from public spheres. 
Succeeding the mujahidin, the Taliban Islamic fundamentalists totally ban women 
from work, education, and appearing in any public sphere without a “mahram” 
(a male companion). It was this brutality of the Taliban that helped the Bush 
administration to justify the war and invasion of Afghanistan.
Conclusion
The central question of this paper was how U.S. gender policy for post-Taliban 
Afghanistan was shaped. To answer this question, I have carefully studied existing 
scholarly literature and credible research papers by high-profile scholars regarding 
this issue. The findings of this paper indicate that U.S. gender policy for post-Taliban 
Afghanistan was shaped through the political discourses of Afghan women’s rights 
and freedoms. During the past nineteen years, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan 
offered some opportunities for a limited segment of Afghan women, mostly of the 
middle class and elite families, including opportunities such as access to education, 
including high-level education in the U.S. universities, job opportunities within 
the government of Afghanistan and with international institutions and NGOs 
that were engaged in different activities in Afghanistan after 2001. However, these 
achievements are not as sustainable as they looked at the beginning of the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan. As such, the announcement of the U.S. troop withdrawal 
from Afghanistan and increased insecurity obviously indicates that women’s rights, 
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freedoms, and achievements are at stake. As U.S.-Taliban peace negotiations are 
ongoing in Doha, Qatar, Afghan women’s rights and freedoms are once again on the 
peace negotiation table. Out of concern, Afghan women are calling on the Afghan 
government to not compromise their rights and freedoms in peace talks with Taliban. 
Additionally, active Afghan women are insisting they be included in the ongoing 
peace talks in order to be able to negotiate and defend women’s rights and their 
freedom that was granted in Afghanistan’s Constitution in 2014. 
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